The Modern Language Notes is proud to publish two sets of notes by Scholem from 1918, which document the progress he and Benjamin made in their study of Kant's critical philosophy and Cohen's interpretation. The notes have never been published before. The first set entitled "Über Kant" attests to the friends' interest in mathematics and the questions it raises about the notion of space in the Critique of Pure Reason and Cohen's discussion of it in Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. The second set entitled "Gegen die metaphysische Erörterung des Raumes" continues with this theme, albeit with emphasis on Cohen's response to Kant's exposition of space in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" in the first Critique. Thanks to Julia Ng's transcription and translation of the notes, as well as her annotations, scholars can now assess the influence of Cohen and mathematical thought on Benjamin's concept of history and Scholem's studies of the Kabbalah.
The articles included in the issue make a powerful case for the importance of Cohen for Benjamin's reflections on poetry, language, history, and fate and Scholem's efforts to conceive, and represent, infinity. In her article "Kant's Theory of Experience at the End of the War: Scholem and Benjamin read Cohen," Julia Ng provides a critical commentary to the two sets of notes written by Scholem published in this issue. Drawing on contemporaneous fragmentary remarks by Benjamin on the neo-Kantian concept of science, Ng argues that in the months leading up to the end of the Great War, Scholem and Benjamin devote much of their time to studying Cohen's Kants Theorie der Erfahrung in an effort to work out a response to one central problem: the invented ground of the neo-Kantian concept of experience. In the milieu of the epochal transition from the historical completion of German Idealism to the birth of the influential new school of phenomenology, Scholem and Benjamin position themselves in a contest between the constructibility of being and the fundamental heterogeneity of the material of reality. Taking a cue from Scholem's mathematical studies, they attempt to formally revise the concepts of infinity, intuition, and concept at work in Cohen's interpretation of Kant's metaphysical exposition of space. As a result, Ng suggests, Scholem and Benjamin arrive at an articulation of the relation between "mathematics and language, i.e., mathematics and thinking" that enables them in turn to bring the theory of experience into relation with its own invented ground.
Werner Hamacher's essay "Intensive Languages" articulates a practical demand for experience that, though unspoken in Kant, precedes every act of thinking and every formal accord between intuition and concept. Through close readings of Walter Benjamin's efforts to understand the linguisticality of language-and hence also close readings of Benjamin's critique and extension of Kant-Hamacher gives us a Benjamin who has arrived, much like Heidegger and in some measure before him, at an ab-original linguistic relation as the basis for what can be thought as being. For Benjamin, and-in a surprising sense-for Kant, the essential and essentially linguistic relation is translatability, which names the motion of intensity that makes all language and all extension possible. Translatability is the infinite demand on language that, as time-ing and space-ing, at once fills and fulfills time and space. This essay thus offers an understanding of Benjamin and Kant that emphasizes the role of translatability as the infinite demand on and for language, its "historicizing" law and essence, and that establishes that language's "historicizing" force marks and makes the space and time of some god. In a sense, then, Hamacher articulates a rational mysticism, an apprehension of cognition itself-that primordial relation at the heart of each of thinking's articulations-as the practical and relational coming-to-be of a cognizability that, with Benjamin and (once more, to our surprise) Kant, is translation understood as the godly, world-ing essence of language.
In his article "Diverging Correspondences concerning the Problem of Identity," Peter Fenves argues that during the First World War a small group of philosophy students, including Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Rosenzweig, and Benjamin, found in the idea of tautology and in certain tautological formulations a primary point of reference in their respective programs for the coming philosophy. In the case of Wittgenstein and Benjamin, the idea of tautology is intimately connected with the development of their theories of language, whose completion requires a thorough rethinking of both the concept of identity and the manner in which it is symbolized. Benjamin and Wittgenstein part ways with regard to the quantification of tautology. In the essay Fenves examines this divergence, which is based in the question of whether tautology should be universalized, as Wittgenstein argues in his correspondence with Russell, or singularized, as Benjamin argues in his correspondence with Scholem.
In "The Infinitesimal as Theological Principle," John H. Smith explores the role that notions of the infinitesimal and the limit, i.e., ideas fundamental to differential calculus, play for philosophical and theological thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The principle of making a difference as small as possible without annihilating it completely, or of approaching a limit without ever reaching it, discovered by Leibniz and Newton and theorized by Hermann Cohen, has been the basis of the mathematical study of motion and change in the real world. And yet, this principle seems to contain something paradoxical that makes it difficult to represent. Precisely this dual nature-both the source of the real and yet unrepresentable-allows it to function for Rosenzweig, Scholem, and Barth as a way to capture their conceptions of God, nothingness, and the gap between immanence and transcendence. Paula Schwebel's article "Intensive Infinity," looks at two of the documented sources for Benjamin's interpretation of Leibniz. According to Schwebel, Benjamin was, on the one hand, immersed in Cohen's interpretation of Leibniz's monad as a precursor to Kant's "anticipations of perception," which, in Cohen's view, enabled the generation of reality from intensive magnitude. On the other hand, Benjamin acknowledged reading Heinz Heimsoeth, who situated Leibniz at the apex of the medieval tradition of German-Christian mysticism. Despite radically different approaches, both Cohen and Heimsoeth credit Leibniz with having accomplished the reconciliation of the infinite and the finite in the monad. For Heimsoeth, Leibniz's monad epitomizes the microcosm of the divine in the created soul. For Cohen, Leibniz's recognition of the principle of continuity paved the way for grounding the dependent results of knowledge in an infinite method. Schwebel draws on these two competing interpretations to claim that in Leibniz Benjamin found a notion of redemption in the self-enclosed world of profane creation.
Pierfrancesco Fiorato begins his essay "'Zeitlos und dennoch nicht ohne historischen Belang'" with an analysis of Benjamin's interpretation of the problem-historical method (Problemgeschichte), as expressed in his dissertation Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik and in his later letter to Florens Christian Rang from December 9, 1923. The analysis brings to the fore some of the analogies between Benjamin's early conception of historical convergence and Hermann Cohen's view. For the young Benjamin, the appearance of the "pure problem" amounts to a "threshold," in which an atemporal aspect of the historical dimension is revealed. The overcoming of temporal extension announced in this manner corresponds to the "ideal sublation of temporal distinctions" discussed by Cohen in his Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls. Fiorato demonstrates that the "sublation of temporal distinctions" leads both Cohen and Benjamin to conceive the deep structure of history as monadic.
In his article "Eine geheime Verabredung: Über Walter Benjamins Umgang mit Theologie," Gérard Raulet proceeds from Scholem's assertion that religion remained for Benjamin the highest order till the end of his days. Numerous statements by Benjamin support this claim. Nevertheless if, as Benjamin asserted, there exists a "secret appointment" between historical materialism and Judaism, then the connection between the two must be situated in the context of the debates regarding Germanness and Jewishness in the early 1900s and traced back to Hermann Cohen. Both the "Theologico-Political Fragment," which likely originated in 1920, as well the "Critique of Violence," written in 1921, respond directly to these debates. Leo Strauss's autobiographical confession that he was "at that time a young Jew, raised in Germany, who was confronted with the theologicalpolitical problem," can easily be read in connection with Benjamin. The essay explores the historical context of Benjamin's work and in so doing avoids the pitfalls of a reductive reading of Benjamin's supposed "messianism."
In "Messianisme et philologie du langage," Marc de Launay revisits Benjamin's attempt between 1916 and 1920 to elaborate a "theory" of language aimed at reconciling mystical aspirations and properly aesthetic concerns in order to justify a new conception of "experience." Benjamin outlines a conception of language that relies on a very inexact reading of Chapters 1-3 of Genesis. In a parallel investigation, Gershom Scholem, who had direct access to Kabbalistic texts, avoids a mystical conception of language and defends instead a critical point of view that he aligns with that of the historian or philologist. After 1921, Benjamin would not develop his initial metaphysical or mystical conception of language further. Instead he would carry over his critique of conceptual reason to his literary texts. Benjamin's initial "messianism" becomes a literary work on remembrance and memory. Meanwhile, Scholem's philological work on Jewish mysticism is unleashed at the moment of an "irrational" decision: to emigrate to Palestine. The question of a common language for each of them thus generates a chiasmus.
Lastly, in "Irreconcilable: Ethics and Aesthetics for Hermann Cohen and Walter Benjamin," Rochelle Tobias notes that Benjamin devotes a significant portion of his essay on Goethe's Elective Affinities to an event, which by his own admission never comes to the pass. The protagonists of the novel never reconcile with each other, nor with themselves, as Benjamin repeatedly underscores, especially in the final section of the essay, where he compares the novel to the novella embedded in it. Why Benjamin nonetheless gives such weight to the notion of reconciliation in his reading of Goethe's novel is the subject of this article. In remarking that "true reconciliation" occurs only with God, Benjamin situates reconciliation in a religious domain. He draws on Hermann Cohen's reflections on Ezekiel and the Jewish Day of Atonement in Religion of Reason to demonstrate that this domain is immanent in experience, even if it "can scarcely be represented in the work of art." In the Goethe essay, Benjamin relies on Cohen to claim that in reconciliation aesthetics reaches its limit. It yields to ethics, which in this essay is identical with religion or, to use Cohen's phrase, ethical monotheism.
